Supermajorities and Gray Areas

This is an interesting article on the upcoming (May 21) independence referendum in Montenegro (my brief earlier on the referendum is here).

More specifically it talks about the implications of the supermajority 55% threshold which the EU set in order for the independence vote to be considered passed.

"While only a very decisive result either way is likely to settle the matter of Montenegro's status, though perhaps not once and for all, such a result looks unlikely. In fact, a result falling into what is now often called the 'gray zone' - showing a pro-independence majority, but one short of the required 55 percent - looks rather more likely, according to polls.



"The pro-union camp and their supporters in Belgrade argue that such a result would simply close the matter and ensure the survival of the state union, even though it is blatantly obvious that a union rejected by a majority, no matter how tiny, will stand a very slim chance of becoming stable and meaningful.

Officials of Montenegro's pro-independence government have suggested that a victory short of the required 55 percent would still be a victory for their cause, even though the terms of the special law under which the referendum is taking place clearly state that this would be a defeat, and one which the pro-union bloc would certainly seize upon.

The EU, which more or less imposed that law on the government, seems also focused on the gray zone, even though the union's special envoy for Montenegro's referendum, Miroslav Lajcak, has repeatedly stressed the law makes no reference to such an outcome. Lajcak has also said, though, that a majority for independence short of 55 percent would mean fresh negotiations between Podgorica and Belgrade on redefining the current state union."



"once it had to accept that a referendum would be held in Montenegro as well, it was unclear what Brussels wanted to achieve by raising the bar to 55 percent. If the goal was to furnish the new state with a clear democratic legitimacy, the EU may find next week that it raised the bar just a bit too high. If it wanted to preserve the state union by bending the rules to suit the pro-unionists, it may yet find out that it has, in fact, only created an official proof that most Montenegrins are against the current state union."

It is an interesting question of what it means when a majority votes for something, but the minority is declared the victor. In theory, it seems logical that a need for a supermajority would be consistent with the level of volatility in support for a particular proposition. This starts from the assumption that the only reason to require a supermajority is to prevent a significant change being made when, most of the time, the population is against that change. For example, a pro-independence movement could hold votes at odd intervals over an indefinite timespan hoping that at some point and under some circumstance, their vote total will exceed 50%.

If, on the other hand, we were to assume that support for some proposition was going to remain the same for the rest of time, I don't see much of a case for denying the majority view. For example, if we know that 53% of Quebecers will support independence for the rest of time, it seem undemocratic to me to insist that this majority must cede to a combination of a minority and historical circumstance.

Small 'c' conservatives might argue that the risk implicit in any kind of change requires a supermajority, but this doesn't really make sense to me. For one thing, what can be changed by referendum can be changed back by referendum. For another, it is inconsistent with small 'c' conservative support for an electoral system which a) transforms minority popular support for parties into a majority of seats and b) magnifies changes in popular opinion - but of these traits working against the preservation of the status quo. But more than anything, I just think that there is a distrust of the popular will implicit in denying the consistent will of the majority due to a belief that the majority does not understand the negative impact of the change it is voting for.

One of the reasons often given for a supermajority requirement, and indeed cited in the article I linked to, is that, "It would indeed look quite bad and would possibly be destabilizing if Montenegro's future status was decided by just a handful of votes." But of course, regardless of the threshold set, there will be a threshold and it will be possible for the vote to end up a few votes either side of that threshold.

For example, you may have noted that May 21 was this Sunday, so the vote in Montenegro is not actually upcoming, it is just past. Early reports

"An unofficial count of all ballots by a referendum monitoring group gave Yes forces 55.5 per cent of the vote - slightly above the 55 per cent minimum set by the European Union for the sovereignty vote to be recognized."

...

"But tensions rose when Predrag Bulatovic, leader of the anti-independence faction, said the rejoicing was premature and accused sovereignists of "tredding a very dangerous path."

"The result is only final when every vote has been counted," Bulatovic told a news conference, adding that a partial count conducted by his supporters put the Yes vote at 54 per cent and the No at 46 per cent."

Ironically, if the EU had set a 50% threshold, the outcome would not be in any doubt tonight. Anyway, I wish the people of Montenegro luck, no matter what happens.

---
Fruits and Votes has some commentary on the referendum as well.

---
Update: It appears to be confirmed that the independence vote has carried the day.